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In this paper I use a unique and rich data set on prices and promotions from major US 
supermarkets to examine the nature of National Brand and Private Label interaction. Private 
labels are priced and promoted competitively with NBs, in a manner suggesting that retails are 
careful not to lose private label market share during times of national brand promotions. The 
price margin between the two types of products continues to fall in US supermarkets, and the 
major determinants of the price differences between the two are promotional frequency and 
market concentration. 
   Private Labels Today 
 
PLs have been of interest to researchers in economics and marketing for almost a century. They 
command attention and generate discussion primarily because of the manners in which they 
differ from NBs. NB products, regardless of the departments in which they are sold, travel from 
the farmgate to the consumer’s dinner plate by way of distributors, often referred to as 
manufacturers or processors in the literature. An illustrative example of an NB is Heinz Ketchup, 
which is manufactured and distributed by the Heinz Corporation across the United States. Heinz 
Ketchup is a homogenous product across every chain that sells it throughout the country, in 
terms of taste, size, and appearance. Alternatively, supermarkets obtain PLs through a form of 
vertical integration or from small firms on the competitive fringe (Berges-Sennou, Bontems, and 
Requillart, 2004) (hereafter BBR). PLs therefore are unique to the chains at which they are sold, 
or at least are marketed as being so. The PL substitutes to Heinz Ketchup germane to this study 
are Safeway Ketchup and Albertsons Ketchup. 
As a result of this dual-channel paradigm, PLs are important components of both 
interstore and intrastore competition. They are uniformly less expensive than their NB substitutes 
and they allow retailers to differentiate themselves from one another in terms of product 
offerings, and hence they are valuable tools in competition with rival chains. However they also 
typically have higher margins than NBs and the profits from the sales of PLs are not shared with 
NB manufacturers, and hence PLs increase the bargaining power of retailers relative to 
manufacturers in the food distribution channel (Narasimhan and Wilcox, 1998; Bontems, 
Monier-Dilhan, and Requillart, 1999). An entire stream of literature, as summarized by Steiner 
(2004), focuses on the competitive interaction between NBs and PLs within stores. Hence PLs are of interest to researchers as well as all agents in the food distribution channel in two key 
competitive dimensions. 
One of the most influential and heavily cited empirical studies on NBs and PLs is Connor 
and Peterson (1992), which examined the major determinants of the NB/PL price margin in 
supermarkets. However it is worth noting the major working assumptions of this paper. The 
authors assumed that the market share of PLs within product categories is very small, that there 
is no product differentiation among PLs, and that PLs are subject to no advertising in newspapers 
or any other media outlets. Each of these assumptions were likely plausible at the time of 
writing, but could be considered no less than heroic in today’s food retailing environment.  
A number of studies, including Corstjens and Lal (2000) and Cotterill and Putsis (2000) 
as well as several more summarized by Steiner have shown that the quality and penetration of 
PLs have sustained a considerable increase in quality and penetration within product categories. 
The food retailing publication Progressive Grocer has dedicated at least one dozen articles from 
the years 2007 through 2009 to the documentation the rise in popularity of PLs and the concerted 
efforts of grocers to promote them to consumers and maximize sales. Retailers are increasingly 
using PLs as a means by which to differentiate themselves from competitors. Safeway alone 
offers three brands of PLs-the flagship Safeway brand, the premium SELECT label, and the O 
Organics label.  Consumer Reports has determined across a wide variety of product categories 
that the quality gap between leading NBs and PLs is narrow to nonexistent and also that there 
exists significant variation in the quality of PLs across chains. Finally, despite arguments from 
the literature that PLs should not be promoted or advertised due to the cannibalization of NBs or 
low promotional elasticities on the part of consumers, my data show that PLs are promoted more frequently than are NBs. Furthermore PLs are featured prominently in both the weekly flyers and 
the television ads for both chains. 
The data used for this study includes only products for which very close pairings were 
possible across NBs and PLs. The criteria for matching across labels imposed that potential 
substitutes be found within the same product category and have the same characteristics used as 
descriptors in the product names. Therefore each pair of products examined in this study is 
matched according to product size as well as defining taste and nutritional attributes such as 
flavor, low sodium content, etc. In total this study analyzes the pricing and promotional behavior 
of over 5,800 unique NB products, each paired with an appropriate PL substitute. Many PL 
products are paired with more than one NB, as most product categories contain multiple NBs 
with similar characteristics. The products span 257 product categories and cover every major 
department in the supermarket.  Additionally, the analysis of this study  does not rely upon 
competitive interaction between chains, and therefore the dataset includes prices and promotions 
from all 17 cities for which online retail data were available. A complete list of the cities is 
available in appendix A. 
Table 6.1 provides the percentage differences between NBs and PLs across four key 
metrics of food retailing. The shelf price is defined as the price printed on the supermarket 
shelves and does not include promotional discounts. The promotional price is the price of 
products, taking into account promotions when applicable. That is, shelf price is equal to 
promotional price in the absence of promotions and the promotional price represents the price 
paid by consumers who use a club car when making purchases. Promotional frequency is the 
percentage of time a given product is on promotion and promotional depth is the percentage 
difference between the shelf price and promotional price, when applicable.   
Table 6.1: Percentage Differences in NB and PL Pricing and Promotional Activity, by 
Department. 
  Percentage Difference, NB-PL 






Beauty Aids  33.99  36.33  -40.18     4.77 
Baby Care  34.92  37.10    -5.36  -14.29 
Baking and Cooking  17.24  17.56  -10.61    -1.42 
Boxed Dinners  28.45  26.83  -11.47     4.04 
Beverages  28.95  27.30    -5.90     2.92 
Breakfast Foods  26.59  26.46  -14.99     2.55 
Canned Goods  23.35  24.82  -15.67     0.37 
Cleaning Products  24.17  23.68  -12.05     2.46 
Condiments  19.25  24.47  -24.96    -3.48 
Coffee and Tea  18.83  19.45  -13.33   14.27 
Dairy  20.58  25.51  -14.19     2.62 
Salad Dressing  16.88  21.08  -25.21    -0.99 
Frozen Food  19.13  22.77    -6.03    -3.69 
General Merchandise  21.57  23.47  -11.72    -1.16 
Health Aids  28.82  29.91  -24.87     4.62 
Mexican  24.61  26.25  -23.05     0.88 
Meat and Seafood  18.13  12.06    -3.20     1.04 
Packaged Bread  33.62  34.54  -22.49     1.27 
Pasta, Rice, & Beans  22.64  22.33  -17.46     3.15 
Snacks  22.98  20.87    -7.00     4.66 
Soup and Chili  25.06  28.39  -45.54     8.26 
Spices & Seasonings  22.23  21.96    -6.32     1.29 
Total  22.89  24.53  -16.35     0.28 
All differences are significant at the 0.01 level. 
 
The first two columns of table 6.1 allows for the immediate comparisons with prior work 
on NB/PL interaction. The margin for shelf prices and promo prices varies considerably across 
supermarket departments. Among shelf prices, the greatest margin is found in the beauty aids 
department, at 34 percent, and smallest margin occurs for the dressing and salad toppings 
department, at close to 17 percent. For some departments, the promo price margin is wider than 
that for the shelf price and for others it is slimmer. Across the entire supermarket, the NB/PL 
margin is 23 percent for shelf prices and 24.5 percent incorporating promotions. These figures 
are significantly lower than 40 percent, as found by Dhar and Hoch (1997) or 30 percent, as found by Ailawadi, Neslin, and Gedenk (2001) (hereafter ANG). Therefore these results support 
the consensus building in the literature that PL prices are rising relative to NB prices, for a 
number of reasons. 
Across the board, promotional frequency is higher for PLs than it is for their NB 
substitutes. On average, a PL product is on promotion 16 percent more often than its close NB 
substitutes. Due to the fact that the data set used in this study has over 1.6 million observations, 
all of the estimates in table 6.1 are very precise and each difference is highly statistically 
significant. However the average difference in promotional depth across labels is negligible, at 
about one quarter of one percent. Therefore it is plain to see that the higher promotional 
frequency for PLs is a likely explanation for the wider overall price margin when considering 
promotional activity.  
Certain products in the data are observed to be on promotion nearly constantly. This 
phenomenon has been neither observed nor discussed in the economic or marketing literature, 
yet it is fairly common in conventional supermarkets. It is also partially responsible for the gap 
in average promotional frequency between NBs and PLs. Examining the entire data set of all 
products sold online at Safeway or Albertsons, nearly 7,200 unique products were on promotion 
at least 85 percent of the time during the data collection.
2
                                                 
2 A product is defined entirely by its name in this data set, which is in turn provided by the chain in which it is sold. 
Therefore an identical NB product sold at both Safeway and Albertsons is counted at two unique products for the 
purposes of this analysis. The entire data set collected from both chains includes approximately 70,000 unique 
products by this definition, after the requisite data cleaning. 
 As the focus is limited to increasingly 
higher promotional frequencies, the products remaining under consideration become more like to 
be PLs. For example, 74 percent of all products on promotion at least half the time are NBs. 
Given that slightly over 80 percent of all products are NBs, PLs are only marginally 
overrepresented among those products on promotions more often than not. However if we consider only those products on promotion at least 85 percent of time, only 28 percent of the 
remaining products are NBs. Therefore PLs are significantly more likely to be placed on constant 
or near constant promotion than are NBs. 
The literature suggests two plausible and complementary explanations for this 
phenomenon.  The first comes from Steiner’s review of the literature on NB/PL instrastore 
competition,  in which he  noted that retailers face a difficult balancing act when setting PL 
promotions, relative to NBs. A price margin between substitutes that is too high signals to 
consumers that the PL is of low quality. However if the margin is too narrow then consumers 
will always purchase the NB because NBs enjoy a “reputation premium” drawn from familiarity 
and longevity on the shelves. The nearly perpetual PL price promotion may represent a solution 
that retailers have found to this pricing conundrum. Under this strategy, PLs are given a clearly 
visible shelf price with that is relatively close to the price of respective NB substitutes. However 
the promotional price provides a wider price margin, increasing the probability that the consumer 
who would always choose the NB at equal prices will purchase the PL. The second explanation 
comes from Chintagunta (2002), who noted that PLs are more likely to be priced strategically to 
maximize penetration within product categories, or maximize sales relative to competing NB 
brands. The primary objective of any promotion is to increase sales and therefore nearly constant 
promotions are likely to be indicative of a concerted effort to market share within product 
categories rather than any standard competitive considerations. 
Figure 6.1  shows how the average promotional frequency for NBs and PLs varies 
according to the number of competing NBs within product categories.  In general, the PL 
promotional frequency follows a clear and direct relationship with the number of NBs, i.e., 
supermarkets promote their PLs more heavily in product categories with more NB substitutes. When the number of NBs is low, between one and four, average PL promotional frequency is 
slightly below 60 percent. However the average PL promo frequency is nearly 80 percent when 
considering product categories with 17 or 18 NBs. Examples of such populous categories include 
ice cream and shredded cheese. Raju, Setharuman, and Dhar (1995) found that the more NB 
products were in a category, the lower was the equilibrium PL market share, and this trend 
suggests that retailers make a more determined effort to promote and expand the market share of 
PLs when they are competing with more NBs.  The overall trend for NB promo frequency is 
similar but less clear, as NB promotional activity appears to peak sharply for categories with 11 
to 14 products from which to choose. As expected, the average promo frequency of PLs exceeds 
that of NBs for each category size. 
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Another issue raised in the literature with respect to NB/PL interaction is the potential for 
NB promotions to put NBs and PLs directly in competition in the eyes of consumers within 
stores. For example, ANG noted that the average NB promotional discount was approximately 
equal to the average price margin between NBs and PLs. ANG determined that while this closing 
of the margin during NB promotions could potentially lead to unprofitable cannibalization within 
product categories, the authors determined that consumers were sufficiently segmented to 
obviate this possibility. Table 6.2 shows the percentage difference between NB promotional 
prices and PL shelf prices, by department. The margin varies widely across departments in terms 
of sign and magnitude. For some departments, such as salad dressing and soup and chili, the NB 
promotional prices undercut the PL shelf prices, on average. Looking at the entire supermarket, 
NB promotional prices are indeed very close to PL shelf prices on average, with a margin of just 
over two percent. As was the case with table 6.1, all percentage differences are significant at the 
0.01 level, but this margin remains small in terms of consumer expenditure. The reputation 
premium enjoyed by NBs due to their longevity in the market and homogeneity across stores has 
not been quantified in the literature but it is almost certain to exceed two or three cents on the 
dollar.  
 
Table 6.2: Statistical Comparison of NB Promotional Prices and PL Shelf Prices, by Department. 
  (1)  (2)   
Department  NB Promotional 
Price ($) 
PL Shelf Price ($)  Percentage 
Difference (1) – (2) 
Beauty Aids  5.15  4.11   20.19 
Baby Care  6.98  4.74   32.09 
Baking and Cooking  4.52  4.68    -3.54 
Boxed Dinners  1.52  1.58    -3.94 
Beverages  2.97  2.86     3.70 
Candy  2.23  2.93  -31.39 
Breakfast Foods  3.41  3.22     5.57 
Canned Goods  1.97  1.98    -0.51 Cleaning Products  6.12  5.70     6.86 
Condiments  2.82  2.94    -4.26 
Coffee and Tea  5.59  5.72    -2.32 
Dairy  3.49  3.01   13.75 
Delicatessen  3.84  3.66     4.69 
Salad Dressing  2.96  3.27  -10.47 
Frozen Food  3.51  3.82    -8.83 
General Merchandise  5.51  5.32     3.44 
Health Aids  5.78  4.95   14.36 
Mexican  2.24  2.21     1.34 
Meat and Seafood  2.78  3.20   15.11 
Packaged Bread  2.53  2.43     3.95 
Produce and Floral  3.08  3.43  -11.36 
Pasta, Rice, and Beans  1.74  1.78    -2.29 
Snacks  2.96  3.03    -2.36 
Soup and Chili  1.78  2.03  -14.05 
Spices and Seasonings  2.86  2.79     2.45 
Total  3.43  3.35     2.33 
All differences are significant at the 0.01 level. 
 
  Several papers have been devoted to the examination of trade promotion pass-through, or 
the rate at which retailers pass on the trade promotions they receive from manufacturers on to 
consumers. Examples of the majority of studies demonstrating significantly less than 100% pass-
through include Tellis and Zufryden (1995), the literature review of Blattberg, Briesch, and Fox 
(1995) (hereafter BBF), and Besanko, Dube, and Gupta (2005). Therefore it is unlikely that this 
margin is so small on average primarily due to the magnitude of manufacturer trade promotions, 
though they may play a role. It is more likely that the NB promotional depths reflect factors such 
as consumer demand or promotional elasticities as they are understood by retailers or the prices 
and promotions of competitors. As mentioned above, ANG argued that this close margin should 
not be a profitability concern on the part of retailers, but the promotional behavior of Safeway 
and Albertsons suggests otherwise. Indeed, table 6.1 shows that the average margin between NB 
and PL prices when accounting for promotions is actually slightly higher than the margin when 
not accounting for promotions, 24 percent to 22 percent. Therefore it appears as if conventional supermarkets are using their PL promotions as a means by which to maintain sufficiently wide 
price margins between NBs and PLs within product categories despite NB promotional activity. 
In stark contrast to the food retailing environment being studied as recently as 10 or 15 
years ago, today’s supermarkets feature PL substitutes for almost every NB product offered in 
the store. Chains are aggressively promoting and advertising their PLs and attempting to market 
them towards traditionally higher-income segments of the population while consensus is building 
that PL quality is generally approaching that of NBs. The statistics presented thus far in this 
study suggest that PLs are priced and promoted to compete with NBs within stores for market 
share. 
Promotional Interaction for National Brand and Private Label Substitutes 
As mentioned above, one of the main reasons why PLs are interesting to researchers is because 
they are components of both interstore and intrastore competition. In this section I apply the a 
contingency analysis to examine competition within stores between NBs and PLs. 
Figure 6.2 provides an illustrative example of two-way contingency table, comparing the 
promotions of PL and NB products for the snack  category, pooling both chains. The only 
products under consideration in this analysis are those NBs and PLs that I have been able to 
match as being close substitutes within product categories. The two-way table reports the total 
promotional frequencies for all possible outcomes promotions can take across labels, namely 
both on promotion, only on promotion if NB, only on promotion if PL, or neither product on 
promotion. Therefore the figure reveals that the NB snack products are on promotion 47.53 
percent of the time, a figure hereafter referred to as pNB. The PL substitutes to these products are 
on promotion 55.69 percent of the time, yielding our pPL. The expected percentage, pE of the 
time promotions occur simultaneously across labels for substitutes, given independence, is thus given by pNB*pPL = 26.46 percent. However the bottom right cell of the contingency table reveals 
that promotions occurred simultaneously for substitutes 28.63  percent of the time. The 
percentage difference between pE and the observed coincidence of joint promotions, pO, is given 
by (pO – pE) / pE = (28.63-26.46) / 26.46 = 8.20 in this case. Therefore NB and PL substitutes are 
on promotion contemporaneously eight percent more often than would be expected given 
independence in pricing across labels.  
Figure 6.2: Contingency Table for the Promotional Comparison of National Brands and Private 
Labels for the Snack Department. 
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Positive values for the percentage difference between expected and observed promotional 
frequencies are interpreted as retaliation and negative values depict accommodation. When 
considering NBs and PLs within chains, the contemporaneous case is of significant importance 
because competition among brands can and does manifest itself as simultaneous promotions. 
This section also accounts for lags of up to four weeks in addition to the contemporaneous case. 
Table 6.3 provides summary statistics for the promotional interaction between NBs and PLs over 
the time series.  
Table 6.3: Summary Statistics on Promotional Interaction between NB and PL Substitutes, by 
Department. 
Department  Mean  St. Deviation  Minimum  Maximum 
Beauty Aids    0.1017***  0.0189    0.0778  0.1411 
Baby Care   -0.0993*  0.1417   -0.3471  0.0411 
Baking and Cooking    0.2641***  0.0168    0.2311  0.2834 
Boxed Dinners    0.2264***  0.0411    0.1571  0.2769 
Beverages    0.1751***  0.0035    0.1690  0.1801 
Breakfast Foods    0.0829***  0.0160    0.0583  0.1090 
Canned Goods    0.2515***  0.0125    0.2245  0.2678 
Cleaning Products    0.0171  0.0995   -0.2482  0.0550 
Condiments    0.2220***  0.1587    0.1598  0.6448 
Coffee and Tea    0.2727***  0.0119    0.2458  0.2872 
Dairy    0.0750***  0.0051    0.0645  0.0797 
Salad Dressing    0.0743***  0.0116    0.0513  0.0870 
Frozen Food    0.1041***  0.0058    0.0947  0.1131 
General Merchandise    0.1936***  0.0102    0.1813  0.2102 
Health Aids    0.0812***  0.0119    0.0714  0.1053 
Meat and Seafood    0.0309***  0.0264   -0.0204  0.0693 
Packaged Bread    0.1346***  0.0114    0.1168  0.1482 
Produce and Floral   -0.0775  0.1230   -0.2426  0.0464 
Pasta, Rice, and Beans    0.2109***  0.0118    0.1871  0.2250 
Snacks    0.1003***  0.0125    0.0816  0.1188 
Soup and Chili    0.1644***  0.0135    0.1501  0.1869 
Spices and Seasonings    0.1045***  0.0708   -0.0113  0.2080 
Total    0.0827***  0.1872   -0.9349  0.6448 
***: Mean is statistically different from zero at the 0.01 level. **: At the 0.05 level. *: At the 0.10 level. 
   
Overall, the frequency of observed joint promotions on NBs and PLs is about eight 
percent higher than the frequency of expected joint promotions. Therefore the relationship 
between NBs and PLs is overall a competitive, retaliatory one. The literature on NB/PL 
competition, as summarized by Steiner, argues that intrastore competition between labels is 
beneficial to social welfare. For most departments, the nature of the promotional interaction is 
retaliatory and statistically significant. Competition is accommodating only for the baby care 
department and it is insignificant for the relatively small cleaning products department and for 
the produce and floral department, which is the unique in that is the only department in the supermarket in which PLs outnumber NBs. A large number of PL products in the produce 
department have no NB substitutes.  
In order to quantify the nature and the determinants of NB/PL promotional interaction, I 
run a regression model with the percentage difference between expected and observed joint 
promotions, as calculated by the two-way contingency tables, as the dependent variable. The 
explanatory variables are drawn from a review on the literature on NB/PL interaction, though it 
is difficult to formulate ex ante expectations on most coefficient signs as the nature of NB/PL 
promotional interaction has not been considered or quantified to any significant degree. The 
model to be estimated is given by: 
(1) 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 = 𝗽𝗽0 + 𝗽𝗽1𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿1𝑖𝑖 + 𝗽𝗽2𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿2𝑖𝑖 + 𝗽𝗽3𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿3𝑖𝑖 + 𝗽𝗽4𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿4𝑖𝑖 +
 𝗽𝗽5𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 + 𝗽𝗽6𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖 + 𝗽𝗽7𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻 𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 + 𝗽𝗽8𝑊𝑊𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆ℎ𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 + 𝗽𝗽9𝑀𝑀𝐻𝐻𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 +
𝗽𝗽11𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 + 𝜷𝜷𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺  + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗  
 
where PromoResponse is the percentage difference between frequency of joint promotions and 
the expected frequency of joint promotions given independence between labels, for product 
pairing i in city j, as calculated above. Lag1, Lag2, Lag3, and Lag4 are binary variables equal to 
one if the response time given to the labels is equal to one, two, three, or four weeks, 
respectively. Storable is a binary equal to one for departments with products that consumers can 
stockpile, meeting the criteria of small size and distant-to-no expiration dates.
3
                                                 
3 At the department level beauty aids, baby care, baking & cooking, boxed dinners, beverages, breakfast foods, 
canned goods,  cleaning products, condiments, coffee & tea, salad dressing, general merchandise, health aids, pasta 
rice & beans, soup & chili, snacks, and spices & seasonings are considered storable. Frozen food is not included due 
to the limited storage space available to consumers for products requiring freezing. 
 When examining 
NB/PL interaction, the contemporaneous case is worth considering and the motivation to 
compete for storable products is potentially stronger in that case. The lag lengths are interacted 
with storability in order to fully decompose the nature of promotional interaction for storable vs. 
non-storable products. NB is also a binary, equal to one if the promotions being lagged are on NB products. In 
order words, it represents the cases in which PL promotions are responding to NB promotions. 
BBF showed that the amount of brand switching that occurs is asymmetric with respect to 
labeling, in that more consumers switch from PL to NB during an NB promotion than the 
converse. Leeflang and Wittink (1996) showed empirically that brand switching increases with 
total market share, a finding in line with BBF. Therefore if in fact NBs and PLs set firms like 
rival firms, PLs would have a stronger motivation to respond directly the NB prices than vice 
versa. However, again, what we might think of as promotional “response” when considering 
rivals can occur simultaneously in the instrastore case, which cannot be identified by this model. 
 Herf gives the market concentration of the city in which the promotional response is 
calculated, as measured by the Herfindahl Index. The relationship between price and 
concentration has been explored extensively in the literature and the overwhelming consensus 
among researchers is that prices rise and in general supermarkets set prices less competitively as 
concentration increases. Volpe and Lavoie (2008) showed that the direct relationship between 
prices and concentration applies much more strongly to NBs, as PL prices rise only marginally in 
concentrated markets. Given that the NB/PL margin is likely to increase with concentration, I 
therefore expect competition between the labels to decrease with concentration. The intuition is 
most clear when considering PLs: retailers have less incentive to closely manage their PL 
promotions with respect to NB promotions if the margin is great enough to preclude the loss of 
PL market share to higher-priced NB substitutes. 
 WalShare is the market share of Wal-Mart, as measured by Supercenters and Sam’s 
Clubs warehouse stores. Several researchers have stressed the importance of considering the 
presence of Wal-Mart when examining supermarket behavior and food retail in general. Supercenters are most popular among low-income consumers Franklin (2001), which is also the 
demographic most likely to purchase PLs. Therefore it stands to reason that PLs are priced more 
competitively in cities in which Wal-Mart is strongest, but this pricing would likely manifest 
itself in more retaliatory interstore pricing. The effect of Wal-Mart Supercenters on NB/PL 
interaction is unclear, though Jones (2004) argues that conventional supermarkets would do best 
to minimize promotions in general when faced with direct competition from Supercenters, which 
could result in weaker competition between NBs and PLs overall. 
MHI is the median household income. As mentioned above, low-income consumers have 
historically been the target demographic for PLs. Therefore as MHI increases, I expect firms to 
have less incentive to promote their PLs competitively with NBs, resulting in weaker NB/PL 
competition overall.  
Finally,  Online  is a binary equal to one for those cities in which both Safeway and 
Albertsons offer online retail. In this data set, those cities are Las Vegas, Los Angeles, San 
Diego, Portland, and Seattle. Given that the presence of two online retailers increases the ease of 
competitive price monitoring, I have reason to expect that interstore competition may be higher 
in these cities. The inclusion of this variable in this intrastore model is mainly to help round out 
the answer to an overarching question in this study investigating whether or not the presence of 
online retailers affects overall pricing strategies. All demographic and market condition variables 
were calculated using data from Market Scope, a publication of Trade Dimensions. Table 6.4 
provides selected summary statistics for the continuous explanatory variables of equation 1 and 
shows that across the 14 cities sampled, the regressors show significant range. 
Table 6.4: Summary Statistics for the Determinants of Promotional Interaction. 
Variable  Units  Mean  St. Deviation  Minimum  Maximum 
Herfindahl  None  0.177  0.039  0.104  0.265 
WalShare  %  8.470  9.836  0.000  29.500 MHI  1000s USD  45.465  9.116  32.456  70.291 
 
Table 6.5  reports the results of the GLS estimation of equation 1, corrected for 
heteroskedastic errors. Overall, the relationship between NB and PL promotions is significantly 
competitive, in that promotions are more likely to overlap across labels than we would expect 
given independence. None of the time period binaries are statistically significant, although the 
negative sign of the binary for four weeks suggests that promotional interaction trails off after 
time.   
 
Table 6.5: GLS Results for the Estimation of Model 1 
  Coefficient  T-statistic 
Intercept  0.0705***  2.75 
Lag1Week  0.0185  1.58 
Lag2Weeks  0.0201  1.57 
Lag3Weeks  0.0018  0.16 
Lag4Weeks  -0.0096  -0.85 
Storable  0.0578***  9.20 
StoreLag1  0.0251  1.20 
StoreLag2  0.0176  0.69 
StoreLag3  0.0106  0.53 
StoreLag4  -0.0096  -0.48 
NB  0.0110  1.27 
Herfindahl  -0.6199***  -4.52 
WalShare  -0.0014***  -3.59 
MHI  0.0026***  6.16 
Online  -0.0030  -0.38 
F  16.11***   
Adj. R
2  4.72   
N  3,357   
***: Coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level. **: At the 0.05 level. *: At the 0.10 level. 
 
Promotional competition is six percent stronger, overall, for storable products. All of the 
interactions between lag lengths and the storable binary are insignificant. Just as with non-
storable products, the contemporaneous case features promotional competition as strong as that 
observed when allowing for responses across brands. While  supermarket chains have less incentive to respond to competitors’ promotions on storable products due to stockpiling, 
supermarket managers are able to intentionally promote NBs and PLs simultaneously in order to 
limit cannibalization and brand switching which may harm PL market share. Therefore the 
incentive exists to compete more, rather than less, fiercely on storable products in this setting. 
In perhaps the most counterintuitive  result in table 6.5,  the coefficient on NB is 
insignificant, meaning that there is no significant difference between NB responses to PL 
promotions or PL responses to NB promotions. Given that retailers have several incentives to 
offer and promote PLs and that NB promotions typically results in more brand switching away 
from PLs than the converse, I expected this coefficient to be positive and significant. The most 
plausible explanation of this finding goes hand-in-hand with the explanation of the finding with 
respect to storability. Namely, that retailers are most careful to promote PLs at the same time as 
key NB substitutes in order to minimize brand switching and maintain PL market share.  
Market concentration, as measured by the Herfindahl, has a strong and significant 
negative effect on NB/PL promotional competition. This finding is in line with expectations, as 
increased concentration tends to lead to significantly higher NB prices, which increases the 
NB/PL margin and reduces retailers’ incentives to promote PLs competitively relative to NBs. 
The presence and market share of Wal-Mart has a small but significant negative effect on NB/PL 
competition. This may be attributed to the fact that supermarkets offer fewer promotions overall 
when competing with Supercenters. Median household income has a small but significant 
positive effect on NB/PL competition. This finding runs contrary to ex ante expectations and 
may reflect the ongoing effort on the part of retailers to improve the quality and penetration of 
PLs. PLs are likely to sell strongly in cities with relatively low incomes, and therefore supermarket managers today may be engaging in stronger efforts to coordinate promotions in 
order to maximize PL sales in areas of higher income. 
In sum, the GLS results indicate that the nature of the interaction between NB and PL 
promotions is competitive rather than accommodating. Steiner noted that competition between 
NBs and PLs within product categories is optimal for social welfare. The results support the 
notion that retailers are aware of the fact that NB promotions, while effective for a number of 
competitive objectives, can be harmful to PL sales. Across the entire supermarket, PL 
promotions are significantly more likely to be in sync with NB promotions than we would expect 
if the two labels were priced and promoted independently of each other. 
 
The National Brand/Private Label Price and Promotional Margins 
 
This study expands the literature on the National Brand/Private Label price margin in two key 
ways. First, it uses a data set of significantly wider scope than any previously used in the topic of 
NB/PL food retail. Second, it examines the margin and its principal determinants in today’s food 
retailing environment, in which PLs have approached NBs in terms of quality, exist in nearly all 
product categories throughout the supermarket, and continue to gain market share relative to NBs 
across the country. In this section I also examine the determinants of the differences between 
NBs and PLs in terms of promotional activity. 
The NB/PL margin is useful for a number of reasons. From the viewpoint of consumers, 
it is fundamental in quantifying the savings that can be achieved by purchasing PLs rather than 
NBs. From the viewpoints of retailers and researchers, price margin can be very illustrative in 
understanding the success of PLs within product categories. In their review of the literature on 
PLs, BBR noted that researchers have found a link between PL market share and the NB/PL price margin, across product categories. Higher PL markets are associated with smaller NB/PL 
margins. While this may seem counterintuitive given that small price differences across labels 
have been shown to result in consumers selecting NBs, it’s important to understand that over 
time the brand equity of PLs will increase if quality is high enough relative to NB substitutes. 
Therefore when supermarket prices reflect consumers’ understanding of the quality of products 
within categories, an equilibrium is reached wherein high-quality (low-quality) PLs have high 
(low) sales and are priced accordingly, resulting in lower  (higher) NB/PL margins. 
A cross-category analysis of the NB/PL margin that controls for a number of likely 
predictors of supermarket prices can shed light on areas in the supermarket where PLs are 
performing strongly today and where they have gained ground in the last two decades. Moreover, 
comparisons of the NB/PL margin with PL sales can highlight where supermarkets have the 
potential to improve their category management and profitability. If PLs are underperforming in 
product categories with relatively low NB/PL margins, then PL sales would likely benefit from 
increasing the margin. Alternatively, PL sales would be less likely to suffer and profits would 
increase from increasing the PL price in categories featuring strong PL sales and relatively high 
NB/PL margins.  
Given that price promotions, redeemable with club cards, constitute a major determinant 
of the prices that consumers pay in conventional supermarkets, any thorough examination of the 
differences between NBs and PLs must also account for promotional activity. Promotions are 
typically defined and described by two key attributes, their frequency and depth. Therefore the 
econometric analysis in this section measures the magnitude and key determinants of the 
differences between NBs and PLs in terms of promotional frequency. The NB/PL promotional frequency and depth margins have the potential to offer insights into the overall strategies of 
supermarket managers with respect to category management.  
The estimation strategy with respect to NB/PL margins assumes that retailers set prices 
and promotions simultaneously, a notion confirmed by the fact that both Safeway and Albertsons 
roll out new prices and promotions on a storewide basis once per week. Therefore the shelf price, 
the promotional status, and the depth of the promotion if enacted are all decided simultaneously 
for products within stores. Therefore I model the shelf price margin, the promotional frequency 
margin, and the promotional depth margin across NBs and PLs as being jointly endogenous. 
Many of the principal determinants of the NB/PL margins, as suggested by the literature, are also 
relevant in this estimation. However one important addition to the model construction in this 
section is the NB promotional frequency. Several studies (BBF, Jedidi, Mela, and Gupta, 1999) 
have shown that high promotional frequency for NB products can diminish brand equity relative 
to competing brands in the long run and in turn lower shelf prices. Therefore NB promotional 
frequency is used as an explanatory variable in the NB/PL price margin equation. 
Formally, the shelf price difference for NB/PL product pairing i in city j is given by: 
(2)  𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻 𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 = 𝗽𝗽0 + 𝗽𝗽1𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 + 𝗽𝗽2𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻 𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 + 𝗽𝗽3𝑊𝑊𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆ℎ𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 + 𝗽𝗽4𝑀𝑀𝐻𝐻𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 +
               𝗽𝗽5𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 + 𝗽𝗽6𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 + 𝗽𝗽7𝑁𝑁𝑢𝑢𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 + 𝗽𝗽8𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 + 𝜷𝜷𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑺𝑺𝑫𝑫𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺  + 𝑢𝑢i,j 
              
 
where the dependent variable, ShelfDif, is the percentage difference in average NB shelf price 
and average PL shelf price for the product pairing i in city j, over the entire time series. That is, 
 
𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻 𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 =
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃 ��������������������𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 − 𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃 ��������������������𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃 ��������������������𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗
 
 
Given that a single PL product can be paired up with multiple NB substitutes within categories, 
the dataset used to estimate equation 2 contains one unique observation per NB product and city.  Select is a binary equal to one if the PL product in pairing i bears the Safeway SELECT label, 
which the firm uses to differentiate its high-quality PLs from its standard PLs, which bear only 
the Safeway name. SELECT products are uniformly more expensive than standard PL 
substitutes, yet still cheaper than NBs. Equation 2 also includes a vector of departmental binaries 
to account for and measure department-specific characteristics across the supermarket. Given 
that the promotional frequency is a simple function of the number of times retailers place a given 
item on promotion, NBFreq is endogenous to this model. Therefore the estimation strategy for 
equation 2 must account for this right-hand-side endogenity. 
The promotional percentage differences between NBs and PLs for product pairing i in 
city j are given by: 
 
(3)    𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻 𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 = 𝗾𝗾0 + 𝗾𝗾1𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 + 𝗾𝗾2𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻 𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 + 𝗾𝗾3𝑊𝑊𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆ℎ𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 + 𝗾𝗾4𝑀𝑀𝐻𝐻𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 +
 𝗾𝗾5𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 + 𝗾𝗾6𝑁𝑁𝑢𝑢𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 + 𝗾𝗾7𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 + +𝜸𝜸𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑺𝑺𝑫𝑫𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺 𝑃𝑃i,j,t 
             
(4)    𝑒𝑒𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻 𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 = 𝗿𝗿0 + 𝗿𝗿1𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 + 𝗿𝗿2𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻 𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 + 𝗿𝗿3𝑊𝑊𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆ℎ𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 + 𝗿𝗿4𝑀𝑀𝐻𝐻𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 +
𝗿𝗿5𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 + 𝗿𝗿6𝑁𝑁𝑢𝑢𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 + 𝗿𝗿7𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 + +𝜹𝜹𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑺𝑺𝑫𝑫𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺 𝑣𝑣i,t 
 
where FreqDif and DepthDif are the percentages differences between NB and PL promotional 
frequency and promotional depth, respectively, for product match i at time t. Table 6.6 provides 
selected summary statistics for the variables pertinent to equations 2, 3, and 4 that were not 
discussed in detail above with respect to promotional interaction. It is interesting to note that the 
average difference in mean shelf and promotional prices are closer to the 30 percent benchmark 
found by ANG (2001) than are the figures reported in table 6.1. The values in table 6.1 were 
calculated across all observations, therefore giving more weight to those products available 
consistently throughout the time series. The higher margins in table 6.6 suggest that NB/PL price 
differences are higher among seasonal, niche, and fringe products.  
Table 6.6: Summary Statistics for Variables Used in Equations 2, 3, and 4. Variable  Units  Mean  St. Deviation  Minimum  Maximum 
MeanShelfDif  %  0.272  0.135  0.001  0.927 
MeanPromoDif  %  0.305  0.140  0.001  0.921 
Number NBs  Count  9.100  4.616  1.000  20.000 
NB Frequency  %  0.467  0.292  0.000  1.000 
FreqDif  %  -0.170  0.296  -1.000  1.000 
DepthDif  %  0.007  0.120  -0.584  0.590 
 
The optimal estimation strategy for equation 2  must account for the right-hand-side 
endogeneity stemming from the inclusion of the NBFreq variable. Even though the sample size 
for these regressions is large (n > 30,000), a systems approach for equations 2, 3, and 4 can yield 
efficiency gains by accounting for covariances across the error terms of the equations. Two 
estimation strategies that meet the criteria of correcting for regressor endogeneity and accounting 
for error term covariances are three-stage least squares (3SLS) and generalized method of 
moments (GMM).  
One potential shortcoming of the 3SLS regression method is that it assumes no 
heteroskedasticity within the error covariance matrix. The general White test performed on 
ordinary least squares  estimations of equations 2, 3, and 4 indicated the possibility of 
heteroskedasticity among the error terms, suggesting that the standard errors of the 3SLS results 
may be biased and inconsistent. Therefore rather than using a 3SLS systems approach I estimate 
equation 2 using two-stage least squares (2SLS), corrected for heteroskedasticity, and equations 
3 and 4 using GLS with White’s corrected standard errors. The weighting matrix of the GMM 
estimation uses White’s  correction for heteroskedasticity and therefore allows for the three 
equations to be estimated as a system in order to achieve potential efficiency gains. Table 6.7 
reports the results of estimating equation 2 using heteroskedasticity-corrected 2SLS and GMM. 
 
Table 6.7: 2SLS and GMM Results for Equation 2, the Determinants of the NB/PL Shelf Price 
Margin. 
  2SLS  GMM   Coefficient  T-statistic  Coefficient  T-statistic 
Intercept    0.2943***  51.88  0.2857***  30.86 
Baby    0.1848***  16.33  0.1756***  12.56 
Baking & Cooking   -0.0527***  -12.25  -0.0540***  -5.63 
Boxed Dinners    0.0394***  6.18  0.0330***  3.03 
Beverages    0.0519***  17.32  0.0474***  6.09 
Breakfast Foods  -0.0018  -0.32  -0.0005  -0.06 
Canned Goods  -0.0051  -1.48  -0.0012  -0.15 
Condiments   -0.0375***  -11.40  -0.0360***  -4.26 
Coffee & Tea  -0.0280***  -7.62  -0.0134*  -1.69 
Dairy  -0.0222***  -7.11  -0.0314***  -4.26 
Salad Dressing  -0.0693***  -17.34  -0.0815***  -11.10 
Frozen Food    0.0095***  2.70  0.0117  1.47 
General Merchandise    0.2383***  6.31  0.2435***  37.70 
Meat & Seafood   0.0182**  2.30  0.0086  0.68 
Packaged Bread   0.0667***  11.78  0.0762***  7.10 
Produce & Floral   0.0084  0.73  -0.0284  -0.93 
Soup & Chili  -0.0136***  -3.32  -0.0118  -1.20 
Snack    0.0250***  -6.56  -0.0198**  -2.44 
Safeway    0.0139***  7.48  0.0125***  3.41 
Herfindahl   0.0372*  1.73  0.0367*  1.66 
Wal-Mart  -0.0000  -0.57  0.0000  0.11 
MHI   0.0000  0.38  0.0000  0.52 
PromoFreq  -0.0736***  -26.21  -0.0596***  -9.32 
Select  -0.0648***  -26.11  -0.0566***  -11.22 
Number NBs  -0.0003*  -1.79  -0.0005  -1.26 
Online  -0.0009  -0.60  -0.0006  -0.40 
Adj. R
2  12.87    12.38   
N  30,215    30,215   
***: Coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level. **: At the 0.05 level. *: At the 0.10 level. 
 
While there are differences across estimation methods in terms of the t-statistics, there is 
very little difference between the 2SLS and GMM results with respect to the signs and 
magnitudes of the coefficients.  The reference department in this estimation is spices and 
seasonings, and the results indicate that there are highly significant differences across 
departments in the NB/PL margin. The highest overall margins are seen the non-food 
departments of general merchandise and baby care. Among the food departments, margins are 
widest for beverages and packaged bread. Margins are thinnest among condiments, salad 
toppings, and coffee.  Keeping in mind the argument that NB/PL price margins can be indicative of quality differences, cola has been cited by Consumer Reports as a product for which PLs fall 
short of NBs in quality, while PL ketchup has regularly tied or even bested NB ketchup in blind 
taste tests. 
Margins are over one percent wider at Safeway, when considering only the Safeway 
flagship brand of PLs. The margin falls by approximately six percent when considering 
Safeway’s SELECT line of products, which provides interesting insights into the pricing 
strategies of a chain with vertically differentiated PLs. Prices, overall, are slightly higher at 
Albertsons. Therefore the results suggest that Safeway prices its standard brand of PL products 
lower than its NBs, relative to Albertsons’ single PL brand, though it prices its SELECT line far 
more competitively with NBs. Safeway advertises its SELECT brand as being of higher quality 
than its standard store brand. Ten percent of the Safeway PL products sampled in this analysis 
are of the SELECT label. 
NB promotional frequency reduces the NB/PL, as expected. A one percent increase in 
NB promotional frequency is associated with a decrease in the margin between six and seven 
percent. This finding supports the notion that the brand equity for heavily promoted NB products 
may be reduced in the long run, leading consumers to have lower perceptions of quality or value 
and thereby closing the NB/PL margin. The effect of the total number of NB substitutes in 
product categories is significant according to the 2SLS results and insignificant, but by either 
estimation method the effect is less than one hundredth of a percent, indicating that this is not an 
important determinant of NB/PL margins. As shown in figure 6.1 above, the number of NBs by 
category is associated with increased promotional activity, but this does not translate into a 
significant change in the price margin across labels. Among market condition and demographic variables, only market concentration  as 
measured by the Herfindahl Index is significant. A one percent increase in the Herfindahl Index 
is associated with an approximately 3.6 percent increase in the NB/PL margin, indicating that the 
price gap is wider in more concentrated cities, another finding in line with expectations. The 
market share of Wal-Mart and income do not significantly affect the margin, nor does the 
presence of two retailers engaging in online retail.  
Figure 6.3 shows the expected NB/PL shelf price margin at conventional supermarkets, 
by department and averaged across chains, using the 2SLS results. Each expectation is taken at 
the average of the continuous explanatory variables and the Safeway SELECT label was not 
included in the calculations. The non-food departments of baby care and general merchandise, 
which feature few PL products relative to most other departments, have NB/PL shelf price 
margins around 45 and 50 percent, respectively. Boxed dinners, beverages, packaged breads, and 
snacks all hover around the 30 percent mark determined by ANG (2001). The remainder of the 
departments have expected margins significantly below 30 percent, providing further evidence 
that PLs are closing the gap with NBs in terms of quality and price. 
 
Figure 6.3: Expected National Brand/Private Label Price Margin, by Department.  
 
Table 6.8 reports the results of estimating equations 3 and 4 using GLS and GMM. 
Among  the frequency and depth equations there is somewhat more divergence between the 
coefficient estimations across methods than seen above for price margins, but the two 
specifications tell very similar stories. Overall, the promotional frequency for PLs is higher than 
it is for NBs by a wide margin, though promotional depth is significantly higher for NBs by a 
slimmer margin and is actually lower for several departments. The departmental binaries reveal 
significant variation throughout the supermarket for both equations.  
 
Table 6.8: GLS and GMM Results for Equations 3 and 4, the Determinants of NB/PL 
Differences in Promotional Activity. 
  GLS  GMM 
  Frequency  Depth  Frequency  Depth 










NB/PL Margin(-17.56)  (6.21)  (-12.85)  (2.94) 
















































































































































































MHI  0.0002  0.0001  0.0002  0.0002** (1.03)  (1.56)  (1.21)  (2.35) 









2  11.20  10.39  7.18  9.47 
N  30,215  30,215  30,215  30,215 
***: Coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level. **: At the 0.05 level. *: At the 0.10 level. 
Heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
The promotional frequency margin is somewhat higher and the promotional depth margin 
is lower at Safeway stores, but these are figures to watch closely as the chain continues to roll 
out its EDLP program. Under EDLP, the difference in promotional frequency or depth between 
NBs and PLs would be expected to be close to zero as promotional activity would be minimal for 
all products. The number of NB substitutes widens the frequency margin only slightly, by less 
than one hundredth of one percent, though this effect is statistically significant. Overall the 
demographic and market condition variables are insignificant in explaining the frequency and 
depth margins, indicating that differences between NBs and PLs in terms of promotional activity 
are determined primarily by departmental characteristics as well as efforts on the part of retailers 
to increase PL market share. Figure 6.4 reports the expected promotional frequency and depth 
margins, by department, based on the results of estimating equations 3 and 4. 
 
Figure 6.4: Expected National Brand/Private Label Promotional Frequency and Depth Margins, 
by Department  
   As before with the expected price margins, the promotional margins are taken at the 
means of the continuous explanatory variables and averaged across chains, using the coefficients 
from the GLS regressions. The negative values for the frequency margin indicate that 
promotional frequency is considerably higher for PLs than NBs for most departments, most 
strikingly for the coffee and tea, general merchandise, packaged bread, and soup and chili 
departments. The margins for promotional depth are considerably smaller in magnitude, and for 
most departments promotional depth is greater for NBs than it is for PLs. In the meat and 
seafood as well as soup and chili departments, the margin exceeds 10 percent, but for most other 












DepthUsing a unique and rich data set of prices and promotions spanning over 250 product categories 
at the Safeway and Albertsons chains, this study provides insights into several research questions 
pertaining to NBs and PLs. Overall, the results suggest that PLs have become significant 
components in the competitive toolbox of supermarket managers. The price margin between NBs 
and PLs has fallen significantly below prior estimates in the literature, indicating that PLs are 
increasing in both quality and market share relative to NBs within product categories. PLs are 
subject to a pricing strategy previously unseen in the economic and marketing literature in that 
certain PL products are on promotion virtually constantly. This phenomenon is more likely to 
occur in product categories with a large number of competing NB brands, suggesting that in 
many cases PLs are being priced and promoted to maximize penetration. 
  The contingency analysis indicates that competition between NBs and PLs in terms of 
promotional timing is significant in that close NB and PL substitutes are considerably more 
likely to be on promotion simultaneously than would be expected if they were priced 
independently. In general such a practice does not conform to standard category management on 
the part of food retailers and provides further evidence that managers are seeking to maximize 
sales of PLs relative to NBs.  
The pricing and promotional margins between NBs and PLs vary widely across 
supermarket departments. Market concentration and NB promotional frequency are important 
determinants of the NB/PL price margin but demographics and market conditions have very little 
explanatory power for differences in promotional frequency and depth. For the most part, PL 
products are promoted much more often than are comparable NB products, while NB promotions 
are slightly deeper than PL promotions. 
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   Appendix 6.A: The Cities Sampled 
 
City  Zip Code  Chain  Population  Median Household Income ($) 
Boise, ID  83705  Albertsons  185,787  42,432 
Palm Springs, CA  92262  Albertsons  42,807  43,800 
Salt Lake City, UT  84101  Albertsons  178,858  37,287 
Los Angeles, CA  90023  Both  3,849,378  42,667 
Las Vegas, NV  89103  Both  478,434  47,863 
Portland, OR  97213  Both  537,081  42,287 
San Diego, CA  92114  Both  1,256,951  55,637 
Seattle, WA  98101  Both  582,424  49,297 
Vancouver, WA  98660  Both  158,855  40,743 
Sacramento, CA  95815  Safeway  453,781  44,867 
San Jose, CA  95113  Safeway  929,936  70,291 
San Francisco, CA  94102  Safeway  744,041  57,496 
Washington, DC  20001  Safeway  581,531  47,221 
Tucson, AZ  85701  Safeway  518,956  34,241 
Philadelphia, PA  08026  Safeway  1,448,394  32,573 
Baltimore, MD  21075  Safeway  631,366  32,456 
Fresno, CA  93650  Safeway  466,714  37,800 
 